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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Avoidance of Tort Releases
A release is a contract whereby the injured party accepts monetary
consideration and agrees in return to forego all claims arising out of his
injury. Ostensibly the agreement is binding, and although, as will be
seen, there are instances where it may be set aside, courts are reluctant to
permit an express agreement to be easily undermined.' Generally, it is
not error for a court to strike a petition2 or sustain a demurrer' when it
has determined that a release exists, for it may be treated as an absolute
bar to a cause of action. The presumption of the validity of a release lies
with the defendant, and such presumption can only be overcome by clear
and convincing proof of defect.4 It is only when the plaintiff has sus-
tained this burden that courts will permit the merits of the case to be
determined by a jury.5
The problem in a given case is that legal and ethical considerations
appear in opposition to one another. On one hand, there is the deep-
rooted legal doctrine that a person is bound by his contracts and that to
permit repudiations would discourage settlements and increase litigation.6
On the other hand, is the fact that an insurance adjuster is frequently an
experienced attorney, motivated by the desire to settle a claim as quickly
and inexpensively as possible. A relatively innocent plaintiff is often
overwhelmed by the skilled negotiator. The experiences of a well-known
trial attorney attest to a practice of promoting inequities:
I have read adjuster's handbooks proffering practices making Fagan's
curriculum, in comparison, seem as noble as the ten commandments.
Some adjusters, not so instructed but being motivated by a desire to
'please the home office,' or because it is an 'accepted custom of their
trade,' I have heard brag of their method of 'ether settlements.' . .7
A subtle and disarming technique indulged in by adjusters has been
to give legal counsel. The claimant may be the recipient of unsolicited
but generously given advice: "You really don't have a case; the company
is only giving you this money in order to avoid problems of litigation and
to maintain good public relations." Relying upon this, the trusting lay-
man signs away all rights, claims, and causes of action. If the releasor
1. E.g., O'Donnel v. Langdon, 170 Ohio St. 528, 166 N.E.2d 756 (1960); Snyder v. Castle,
16 Ohio App. 333 (1922); Jones v. Pickle, 7 Ohio App. 33 (1916).
2. Felder v. Paugh, 84 Ohio App. 271, 81 N.E.2d 639 (1948).
3. O'Donnel v. Langdon, 170 Ohio St. 528, 166 N.E.2d 756 (1960).
4. See Fraser v. Glass, 311 II. App. 336, 35 N.E.2d 953 (1941); Jones v. Pickle, 7 Ohio
App. 33 (1916); Edwards Mfg. Co. v. Perry, 4 Ohio App. 390 (1915).
5. See Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Lewis, 109 I1. 120 (1894); O'Grady v. City of
Newark, 6 Ohio App. 388 (1917).
6. O'Donnel v. Langdon, 170 Ohio St. 528, 166 N.E.2d 756 (1960). Contra, Ricketts v.
Pennsylvania R.R, 153 F.2d 757, 767 (2d Cir. 1946) (concurring opinion).
7. 1 BELLI, MODERNTRIALS 347 (1954).
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ever realizes his mistake, he is precluded from further action by the pre-
cept that a unilateral mistake of law will not warrant the rescission of a
contract s
The Federal Bar Association has recognized this problem and has
admonished adjusters that to advise a claimant as to law constitutes a
breach of professional ethics.9 Various courts have permitted rescission
of releases, as opposed to other contracts, when a misrepresentation of
law has occurred."0 Even bare unilateral mistake of law will occasion-
ally warrant the setting aside of a release where there is a showing that
otherwise gross injustice will result."
As with all contracts, the construction of a release is controlled by
the intent of the parties, as manifested by the written word.' Where
there is no ambiguity on the face of the document, a court will not create
a new agreement. 3 The phrase, "intent of the parties," is flexible and
elusive of precise definition. A modern trend in interpreting this intent
has been to scrutinize the contract to see if it meets standards of fairness
and justice.'" Under this view, questions such as whether the execution
was concluded with unseemly haste are evaluated.'5
In a recent case' the defendant .tortfeasor suggested that to set aside
a release merely because it embodied some injustice would discourage
settlements and engender disregard for contractual obligations. The
court countered:
That is a glib. prediction based upon no evidence and intended to
frighten the court. Sometimes judges have been persuaded by such
prophecies which later events have shown to have been unfounded.17
Despite an indication that occasionally lower courts are sympathetic to
8. See 5 WILLiSTON, CONTRACrS §§ 1581-82 (1937).
9. See statement of Conference Committee on Adjusters in 3 MARTINDALE-HUBBEL, LAW
DIREcroRY 144A & 145A (1962) :
"4(a) The companies or their representatives will not advise the claimant as to his legal
rights."
"5 (c) The companies or their representatives will not advise a claimant to refrain from
seeking legal advice, or against the retention of counsel to protect his interest."
"5 (f) The companies recognize that the Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Associa-
tion apply to all branches of the legal profession, and that specialists in particular branches are
not to be considered as exempt from the application of those Canons."
10. Sainsbury v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 183 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1960). See 1
BELLI, MODEm TRIALs 346-47 (1954).
11. Reggio v. Warren, 207 Mass. 525, 93 N.E. 805 (1911).
12. Adams Express Co. v. Beckwith, 100 Ohio St. 348, 126 NE. 300 (1919).
13. Ibid.
14. Scott v. Bodnar, 52 N.J. Super. 439, 145 A.2d 643 (Super. Ct. 1958); Greenfield v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 75 Ohio App. 122, 61 N.E.2d 226 (1944).
15. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Lewis, 109 IMI. 120 (1894).
16. Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1946).
17. Id. at 769 (concurring opinion).
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this approach, 8 the Ohio Supreme Court has refrained from approving
this modern trend, and although the court will not hold sacrosanct a
contract which is shockingly cruel, 9 neither will it permit a release to be
attacked merely because it appears unfair or unjust."0 Thus, there is a
presumption that the release has settled the claim. The plaintiff's posi-
tion is difficult, but relief is not invariably precluded. The existence of
certain facts may permit the releasor to avoid his agreement of settlement
and to prosecute his original tort claim.
FRAUD AND MUTUAL MISTAKE
Fraud
In attempting to overcome a release and to continue in an action for
damages on grounds that such release was fraudulent, one must be par-
ticularly aware of the distinction between fraud in the inducement and
fraud in the execution. Fraud in the execution has been defined as that
which goes directly to the instrument."' In other words, where a person
without negligence on his part is fraudulently led to believe that he is
signing something other than a release, a receipt, for example, the fraud
goes directly to the instrument. Fraud in the inducement exists where
the claimant knows that the document is a release, but is misled into sign-
ing it by representations which are ancillary to the instrument. 2  In-
tentionally false statements as to the extent of the person's injuries or of
his prognosis may constitute fraud in the inducement. 3
The importance of recognizing the different species of fraud was
brought into clear focus in Dice v. Akron, Canton, & Youngstown Rail-
road.4 An action for damages was brought by an injured employee un-
der the Federal Employer's Liability Act. 5 The employee had previously
signed a release, but claimed that the release had been obtained by fraud.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that if there had been any fraud it was in
the inducement. The fraudulently induced instrument was voidable, that
is, it was valid and binding until judicially rescinded. Rescission of the
release was denied for the reason that the plaintiff omitted to state in his
petition that he had tendered to the defendant the consideration received
18. Greenfield v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 75 Ohio App. 122, 61 N.E.2d 226 (1944).
19. Pittsburgh, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St. 64, 115 N.E. 505 (1916).
20. O'Donnel v. Langdon, 170 Ohio St. 528, 166 N.E.2d 756 (1960). Note the dissent
by Zimmerman, J., id. at 531, 166 N.E.2d at 758.
21. Perry v. M. O'Neil & Co., 78 Ohio St. 200, 85 N.E. 41 (1908).
22. Picklesimer v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 151 Ohio St. 1, 84 N.E.2d 214 (1949).
23. Ibid.
24. 155 Ohio St. 185, 98 NE.2d 301 (1951), rev'd, 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
25. 35 Star. 65 (1908), as amended 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958).
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under the release2 Failure to allege either actual return of the consider-
ation or tender thereof is fatal to the plaintiff's claim and the release
stands.2
When the fraud goes to the instrument itself, the release is wholly
void. The plaintiff need not acknowledge it in his petition and may suc-
cessfully meet its effects by reply. There is no necessity of tender.28
Certain operative difficulties are apparent in the distinction between
fraud in the inducement and fraud in the execution. Most obvious is the
fact that one cannot always be certain that a particular fraudulent situa-
tion falls within one of the definitions to the exclusion of the other.
Moreover, the supreme court has not been notably helpful in adequately
articulating this line of demarcation2 9
In Shallenberger v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Company0 the plain-
tiff attempted to forego questioning the validity of his release and in-
stead brought an action in fraud directly against the tortfeasor's insurance
company."' The plaintiff had been injured in an automobile accident
while driving a borrowed car. The insurance company's agent told the
plaintiff that she would have to sign a paper to enable the owner of the
borrowed vehicle to recover his property damages. She was assured that
such was a mere formality and would not affect her rights. In reliance
upon these representations and without reading the contract, the plaintiff
signed an absolute release. Thereafter, she brought an action for dam-
ages against the insurance company, claiming that the company's deceit-
ful conduct had negated her right to recover from the insured. The Ohio
26. See Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Burke, 69 Ohio St. 294, 70 N.E. 74 (1903). Accord,
Picklesimer v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 151 Ohio St. 1, 84 N.E.2d 214 (1949); Kercher v.
Brown, 72 N.E.2d 588 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947); Conrad v. Keller Brick Co., 12 Ohio C.C.R.
(n.s.) 126 (Cir. Ct. 1907); affl'd, 79 Ohio St. 461, 87 N.E. 1134 (1909); Bragg v. Ohio
Elec. Ry., 23 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 140 (C.P. 1920); Crawley v. Indiana, Columbus & E. Traction
Co., 15 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 157 -(C.P. 1912).
27. Stark v. Testo, 106 Ohio App. 386, 148 N.E.2d 109 (1958). See Hancock v. Black-
well, 139 Mo. 440, 41 S.W. 205 (1897).
It is noteworthy that the Dice case was overruled by the United States Supreme Court.
The ruling of that tribunal, however, concerned only cases brought by virtue of the Federal
Employers Liability Act. The Dice case still states the applicable Ohio law and was expressly
approved in McCluskey v. Budnick, 165 Ohio St. 533, 138 NE.2d 386 (1956).
28. Soeder Sons Milk Co. v. Salacienski, 32 OHIO L. REp. 161 (Ct. App. 1930); Jones v.
Pickle, 7 Ohio App. 33 (1916).
29. See Robinson v. Easton, 14 Ohio C.C.R. (ns.) 87 (Cir. Ct. 1911), which sets 'forth
the early supreme court cases which have settled this point in Ohio.
30. 167 Ohio St. 494, 150 N.E.2d 295 (1958).
31. Three reasons may be assessed as having possibly contributed to this procedure:
(1) The facts present a middle ground between fraud in the inducement and fraud in
the execution. It is possible that the attorney did not know which course to follow.
(2) If the release had been treated as fraud in the inducement, it is probable that the
plaintiff's negligence in failing to read the release before signing it would have prevented
rescission. E.g., Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 155 Ohio St. 185, 98 N.E.2d 301 (1951), rev'd
on other grounds, 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
(3) A successful action for fraud may have warranted punitive damages.
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court proved unreceptive to this theory and held that the complaint
lacked that element of damages essential to a cause of action in deceit.
If the release had been fraudulently induced, plaintiff's only recourse was
to have it set aside and to continue in an action based upon the original
tort. If the release had been fraudulently executed, it was void ab initio
and never existed at law. In such event, there was no damage to the
plaintiff as there was no release.32
The Shallenberger case affirms with undeviating rigidity the classic
distinction between frauds. This has not been the situation in other juris-
dictions. In Ricketts v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company3 Judge Franks
of the Second Circuit indicated that the theories of void and voidable re-
leases may do a greater disservice than service and that they should gen-
erally be ignored. 4 In an early Mississippi case the court logically con-
cluded that where a person did not know of his right to repudiate a void-
able release, bringing the action which the release was supposed to bar
was equivalent to repudiation. 5
The preceding commentary is not intended to convey the impression
that a distinct suit for equitable rescission of a release is a prerequisite to
a second suit for damages. On the contrary, the two issues may be
merged into a single petition. Furthermore, the court has discretion to
submit all the issues, including the question of whether the release was
void or voidable, to the jury."
In Martin v. Sentker 7 the plaintiff was injured while a passenger on
defendant's roller coaster. Defendant set up a release as a bar to the
action, to which the plaintiff replied that the release was fraudulently
executed and void. The relevant facts were in dispute and the entire
matter was submitted to the jury. A general verdict was rendered for
the plaintiff. There was no specific finding as to whether the release
was wholly void or not. This issue was especially pertinent, as the plain-
tiff had not tendered the return of payment received by virtue of the con-
tract. The court of appeals held that implicit in the general verdict was
a finding that the plaintiff had not released his claim. The alleged re-
lease was void, and tender was not a condition precedent to the right of
32. Some jurisdictions permit this type of action. See Patrison v. Highway Ins. Under-
writers, 278 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Ct. App. 1955), approved, 292 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Cc. App.
1956).
33. 153 F.2d 757 (2d Cit. 1946).
34. Id. at 770.
35. Alabama & Va. Ry. v. Jones, 73 Miss. 110, 19 So. 105 .(1895).
36. Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 155 Ohio St. 185, 98 N.E.2d 301 (1951), rev'd on other
grounds, 342 U.S. 359 (1952); Flynn v. Sharon Steel Corp., 142 Ohio St. 145, 50 N.E.2d
319 (1943). But see Ulrich v. McDonough, 89 Ohio App. 178, 101 N.E.2d 163 (1950),
where the court stated that fraud became a question of fact for the jury and held the lower
court was not justified in directing a verdict for the defendant.
37. 12 Ohio App. 46 (1918).
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recovery. This case stands for the proposition that where there is con-
flicting evidence as to the nature of the fraud, a general verdict in favor
of the plaintiff will be conclusive that the release was fraudulently ex-
ecuted and therefore void.38
Mistake
A second means of attacking the validity of a release is to allege that
at the time of execution both parties were mistaken as to the facts essen-
tial to the contract. 9 A mistake of fact will not permit the rescinding
of a release unless the mistake is actually mutual; and it must compre-
hend a material aspect of the contract. The Restatement of Contracts
provides:
A mistake of only one party that forms the basis on which he enters
into a transaction does not of itself render the transaction voidable; nor
do such mistakes of both parties if the respective mistakes relate to
different matters; but if the mistakes relate to the same matter, the power
of avoidance is not precluded because the mistakes of the parties as to
that fact are not the same.40
Insurance companies have noted the necessity for mutuality and have
included in most release forms an express provision denying liability for
subsequently discovered injuries.4' An injured party who sells his tort
claim too soon or for too little does so at his own risk.4' He will find a
court inhospitable to a claim that he suddenly discovered additional in-
juries."' His protestation of ignorance at the time of contracting will be
unavailing, for the written agreement is decisive. If there was any mis-
take, it was unilateral and the company foresaw and provided for this
possibility."4  The deafness of the court to such plaintiff's arguments is
not unqualified. To allow a release of trifling harm to cover crippling
impairment would be intolerable. The claimant may be afforded the
opportunity to convince the court that, notwithstanding the literality of
the contract, there was a mutual reliance upon the assumption that no
further injuries existed.4 In view of the presumption that a written
agreement expresses the will of the parties, the task of persuasion is
38. See Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Lewis, 109 IM. 120 (1884).
39. See 1 BELLI, MODERN TRIALs 348 (1954).
40. RESTATEmBENT, CONTRACtS S 503 (1932).
41. See Chicago & Nw. Ry. v. Curl, 178 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1949).
42. Corbett v. Bonney, 202 Va. 933, 121 S.E.2d 476 (1961); Diltz v. Sherrick, 108 Ohio
App. 188, 161 NE.2d 93 (1958).
43. DeWitt v. Miami Transit Co., 95 So. 2d 898 (la. 1957); Mandenhall v. Vandeventer,
61 N.M. 277, 299 P.2d 457 (1956); Stumpf v. Stumpf, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 479 (Ct. App.
1938).
44. See Stiff v. Newman, 134 So. 2d 260 (Fla. Ct. App.); afl'd mem., 135 So. 2d 17
(Fla. 1961).
45. Stumpf v. Stumpf, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 479 (Ct. App. 1938).
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laborious. The claimant is, however, fortified by a rule of construction
that no matter how broad the release, it releases only what is definitely
referred to - that the specific rules the general.46
Erroneous medical prognosis preceding a release has been prominent
in many successful avoidances where mutual mistake was an issue.47 In
an Indiana case4" the plaintiff entered defendant's hardware store to pur-
chase plumbing supplies. He was invited by a clerk to step into an ele-
vator and ride to the second floor. The area was unlighted and neither
the clerk nor the plaintiff was aware that the elevator was elsewhere until
the plaintiff stepped into the vacant shaft. A doctor, who was consulted,
examined only the plaintiff's ribs, hips, and knee, concluding that the
injuries were superficial. Plaintiff and defendant's insurance company
entered into a contract, whereby the plaintiff released any and all claims
arising out of the injury for a sum of $140. Later it was shown that the
fall had caused a permanent and crippling back injury. The court set
aside the release, saying that neither party had contemplated the extent of
the injuries, but each had relied upon the medical assurances that the in-
juries were not serious. The plaintiff was entitled to avoid the contract,
as it had been executed in an environment of mutual mistake. " Such
holdings are limited by the facts of the case and the attitude of the juris-
diction. Even where the doctor is wrong, the right to rescind may be
somewhat tenuous. In Kostick v. Swain5" a release for $215 was entered
into after doctors employed by both parties had examined the claimant.
The examinations failed to reveal a severe back injury which rendered the
plaintiff unable to work for a period of one year. Despite the medical
representations, the California court refused to permit the release to be
ignored. The plaintiff was held to have known what he was signing and
to have assumed the risk of subsequently discovered injuries.
The preceding discussion indicates that although insurance releases
may be set aside, the tendency of courts has been to regard them as bind-
ing contracts, unassailable except by clear and convincing evidence of
fraud or mutual mistake. An attorney who seeks to prosecute his client's
tort claim, notwithstanding a prior release, must be prepared for a vigor-
ous struggle. Judicial latitude varies with the jurisdiction. The recent
46. Havighurst, Problems Concerning Settlement Agreements, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 283,
286-87 (1958).
47. E.g., Chicago Nw. Ry. v. Curl, 178 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1949); Farmers' Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Buss, 188 F. Supp. 895 (D. Kan. 1960); Clancy v. Pacenti, 15 Ill. App. 2d 171,
145 N.E.2d 802 (1957); Fraser v. Glass, 311 Ill. App. 336, 35 N.E.2d 953 (1941); Kopp
v. Diamond K Markets, Inc., 141 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sup. Ct. 1955); K. C. Motor Co. v. Miller,
185 Okla. 84, 90 P.2d 433 (1939); Seaboard Ice Co. v. Lee, 199 Va. 243, 99 S.E.2d 721
(1957).
48. Crane Co. v. Newman, 111 Ind. App. 273, 37 N.E.2d 732 (1941).
49. Accord, see cases cited in note 47 supra.
50. 116 Cal. App. 2d 187, 253 P.2d 531 (1953).
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case of O'Donnel v. Langdon5' expresses the position of the Ohio Su-
preme Court. Plaintiff, while riding a motorcycle, was struck by defend-
ant's automobile. The insurance company quickly induced the plaintiff
to sign a release for $56.90 (the cost of repairing the motorcycle). Al-
though plaintiff only intended to settle his property damage, the release
purported to be absolute. The Ohio Supreme Court said that the sole
issue was whether the plaintiff intended to execute a contract of settle-
ment. As this was admitted, there was no cause of action. The court
expressed its apparent belief in the immutability of contracts as follows:
To condone this plaintiff's conduct would seem to reduce the value of
a legitimate release to the vanishing point by encouraging individuals
to sign the document with the feeling that it can be nullified at will
and without regard to the failure of a signer to exercise any care in his
own behalf.5
Thus, there exists no touchstone by which an attorney may predict his
success in suing in spite of previous settlement. One should not be un-
mindful, however, of certain factors which have been the foundation for
avoiding releases in Ohio and other jurisdictions.
STATE OF MIND OF CLAIMANT
A most profitable area of consideration for the plaintiff's attorney is
the mental and physical health of his client at the time the release was
signed. It is not uncommon to uncover facts that will indicate to a jury
that the plaintiff was incapacitated to the extent of being unable to intend
to contract.5" In an Arkansas case a ninety-year-old man entered into a
release while under the influence of codeine tablets which had been pre-
scribed to ease his pain. Medical testimony that even a small amount of
codeine would affect the mental processes of a man of that age was suffi-
cient to enable the jury to find that the plaintiff lacked capacity to enter
into a valid contract.5" In a California case an $800 release was set aside
and a verdict of $3,500 rendered upon a showing that at the time of con-
tracting the plaintiff was in a dazed, semi-conscious condition.55 Simi-
larly, in a Massachusetts case the fact that the plaintiff was somewhat
shaken by the accident was sufficient for avoidance.5" An early Ohio de-
cision held that where the claimant was confined to her bed suffering
51. 170 Ohio St. 528, 166 NXE.2d 756 (1960).
52. Id. at 530, 166 N.E.2d at 758. Compare Lusted v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 71 Wis. 391(1888).
53. The Ohio rule is that issues of capacity and intent are for the jury. Brown v. Kiechler
Mfg. Co., 98 Ohio St. 440, 121 N.E. 901 (1918); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Svonavec, 32 Ohio
App. 195, 166 NE. 905 (1929).
54. Gillenwater v. Johnson, 226 Ark. 400, 290 S.W.2d 1 (1956).
55. Backus v. Sessions, 17 Cal. 2d 380, 110 P.2d 51 (1941).
56. Bliss v. New York C. & H.R.R., 160 Mass. 447, 36 N.E. 65 (1894).
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mental and bodily pains and under the influence of opiates at the time of
entering into a settlement agreement, such agreement was void and not a
bar to an action for damages.57
Agreements which are executed immediately following the accident
are viewed suspiciously as indicating that the injured party was still sig-
nificantly under the influence of trauma and unable to formulate a valid
intent." Such a situation was determinative where an adjuster ignored
a "no visitors" sign, entered plaintiff's hospital room, and secured a set-
tlement in less than one hour.59
Duress
On occasion, insurance adjusters have been known to use duress in ob-
taining a release. A classic example occurred when an agent told an
ignorant laborer that he was in trouble with the police and could only be
protected by signing his name to a settlement. The Nebraska Supreme
Court held that this was of sufficient magnitude to warrant submitting
the issue of fraud to the jury."
Misunderstanding of Substance of Release
Courts have not favorably acknowledged the bare assertion that the
plaintiff did not understand what he signed where there has been no
further showing of mental or emotional disability. As a rule, a person
cannot be heard to say that he was misled when he could have attained
the truth by further investigation."  In Fay v. Buckeye Pipe Line Com-
pany62 the claimant did not have his glasses, and the release was read to
him by the adjuster. The contract was read fully and in good faith. The
plaintiff misinterpreted what he had heard and signed in reliance upon
his misinterpretation. The agreement was held binding. The plaintiff
was required to understand what was read to him and its import. Cases
to the contrary usually contain an added factor of intentional misrepresen-
tation on the part of the insurance agent."
57. Perry v. M. O'Neil & Co., 78 Ohio St. 200, 85 N.E. 41 (1908).
58. McGregor v. Mills, 280 S.W.2d 161 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955); Red Top Cab Co. v. Whit-
field, 26 Ohio App. 373, 159 N.E. 848 (1927).
59. Leonard v. Hare, 325 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Ct. App. 1959), aff'd, 336 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.
1960). See Klettke v. Checker Taxi Co., 26 111. App. 2d 341, 168 N.R2d 453 (1960).
60. Bryant v. Greene, 164 Neb. 15, 81 N.W.2d 580 (1957). See also Service Fire Ins. Co.
v. Reed, 220 Miss. 794, 72 So. 2d 197 (1954).
61. McFall v. Conner, 162 N.E.2d 876 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959). In Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railroad Company v. Vanordstrand, 67 Kan. 386, 73 Pac. 113 (1903), the court
stated that being in a hurry is not an excuse for not having read the release before signing.
62. 30 Ohio App. 316, 164 N.E. 782 (1928).
63. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Gastelum, 36 Ariz. 106, 283 Pac. 719 (1929); Schubert v.
St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 358 Mo. 303, 214 S.W.2d 420 (1948); Whitehead v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 194 Ore. 106, 239 P.2d 226 (1951).
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Experience and Intelligence
Significant differences in intelligence and experience between an ad-
juster and a claimant should be weighed in determining the effect of a
misrepresentation. A disparity in backgrounds was germain to a decision
where a lawyer-adjuster, who had settled claims for over one hundred
companies, negotiated a release with an illiterate claimant. The claimant
expressed the belief that his injuries were worth $10,000. The insurance
agent acknowledged this statement derisively and told him that he could
not hope to recover more than $600 if he went to court. This was held
to be substantial evidence of fraud." The court was more impressed with
the argument that the plaintiff had been wrongfully misled than with the
binding effect of sterile legal formalities. The court stated:
When we consider the vast difference in the intelligence, education,
background, training and experience of these two men ... and then
consider all of the testimony and other evidence concerning the settle-
ment they negotiated, we find it difficult to escape the conclusion
that the skilled adjuster resorted to statements which he knew were false
in order to induce the illiterate laborer, for a grossly inadequate con-
sideration, to release his claim. 5
The court affirmed the rescission of the $500 release and a subsequent
verdict of $18,000. 66
In addition to the requirement that an adjuster must exercise meticu-
lous care not to mislead one who is intellectually less competent than
himself is the affirmative duty to explain fully the nature and effect of
a proposed settlement. The obligation is increased when the releasor is
illiterate."2  In Scott v. Bodnari the plaintiff was an illiterate woman
of low mental capacity. She was struck by defendant's truck and a re-
lease was negotiated. The plaintiff neither knew what she was doing
nor did she consult an attorney. Although the adjuster, who had not
explained the agreement, pleaded ignorance of any misunderstanding,
the court concluded that the mental deficiencies of the claimant should
have been so apparent as to constitute a warning to the adjuster to
make certain of absolute comprehension. Otherwise, the parties could
not be said to have dealt on that basis of equality which fairness and
justice demand.
A 1903 decision of an Ohio circuit court69 concerned an injury to
64. Frazier v. Sims Motor Trans. Lines, Inc., 196 F.2d 914 (7th Cir. 1952).
65. Id. at 917.
66. See Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Gill, 227 F.2d 64 (4th Cir. 1955); Jordan v. Guerra, 23
Cal. 2d 469, 144 P.2d 349 (1943); Parker v. United Tank Truck Rental, Inc., 190 N.Y.S.2d
250 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
67. Miller v. Spokane Intel Ry., 82 Wash. 170. 143 Pac. 981 (1914); Burik v. Dundee
Woolen Co., 66 N.J.L. 420, 49 Ad. 442 (Sup. Ct. 1901).
68. 52 N.J. Super. 439, 145 A.2d 643 (Super. Ct. 1958).
69. Lake Shore & M. So. I.R. v. Ehlert, 1 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 418 (Cir. Ct. 1903).
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an employee whose mastery of the English language was barely suffi-
cient to permit normal communication. A release was read to him and
executed for the consideration of one dollar. Clearly, he had no under-
standing of the significance of the document, for at the conclusion of the
formalities he asked the attorneys what the dollar was for; ". . . they
said for him to'take it out and spend it.""0 The court rescinded the settle-
ment and said:
The parties with whom such dealings are had should be negotiated
with, and the facts explained fully and perfectly - that they are buying
him off....71
The requirement that an insurance adjuster must disclose the full
nature of the agreement rests upon the uncertain basis of judicial deter-
mination as to who is and who is not mentally competent. The Ohio
case of McCuskey v. Budnick72 emphasizes the resultant inconsistency.
The plaintiff was unable to avoid his contract of settlement because the
court concluded that he was a person of ordinary mind, sufficiently in-
telligent to comprehend the release. A glance at some of the plaintiff's
testimony warrants the implication that he was at least extremely naive.
A. * * * He said, 'Sign right here.' I didn't pay no attention to
nothing.
Q. But you don't know whether it [the release] was covered up or not?
A. When I signed this, as far as me seeing 'release' and all that, as
far as me reading this, the man didn't ask me to read nothing. And he
said, 'Sign this, and you will get your car.' And I signed it and that was
all there was to it.73
CONSIDERATION
Grossly inadequate consideration in a contract of release will never,
when standing alone, warrant an avoidance. It will, however, be con-
sidered as evidence tending to establish fraud or mutual mistake. 4 The
extent to which the question of sufficiency of payment will be deter-
minative is individual to each jurisdiction. In a California decision the
inadequate amount for which a permanent disability was settled was
held to suggest that the tortfeasor did not intend to be completely ab-
solved from liability. The release was avoided for mutual mistake."5
The issue in an early Wisconsin case was whether in signing the
settlement it was intended that the cause of action as to personal injuries
was released along with property damages. It was stated that the $50
consideration did not fully pay for the plaintiff's loss of property. There-
70. Id. at 422.
71. Ibid.
72. 165 Ohio St. 533, 138 N.E.2d 386 (1956).
73. Id. at 535, 138 N.E.2d at 387.
74. Wilson v. Southwest Cas. Ins. Co., 288 Ark. 59, 305 S.W.2d 677 (1957).
75. Union Pac. R.R. v. Zimmer, 87 Cal. App. 2d 524, 197 P.2d 363 (1948).
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fore, it certainly did not comprehend settlement of substantial personal
injury.76
Two Ohio cases illustrate a contrary theory. In Toledo & Ohio
Central Railroad Company v. Coleman 7 the plaintiff had received a
severe eye injury and was told by his employer to sign a release in con-
sideration of one dollar. He was assured that this was a mere formality
and would not preclude any substantive right of action. Even if both
the plaintiff and defendant had actually believed that the document was
no more than a formality, the court would not permit it to be avoided.
The fact that one dollar was ridiculously small was held meaningless.
Equivalent reasoning negated the plaintiff's right of action in O'Donnel
v. Langdon 8
CHARACTER OF INSTRUMENT
Release of Joint Tortfeasor
This area has been responsible for much disappointment to claimants.
The invariable statement of law is that a release of one joint or con-
current tortfeasor, releases the others. 9 Difficulty in determining whether
a party is jointly liable has engendered confusion. In Garbe v. Halloran"
the plaintiff's automobile was hit by X and turned sideways. Six seconds
later Y collided with the helpless vehicle. Settlement as to the property
damage was made with X for $350. The second collision had occasioned
personal injury, and the plaintiff brought an action against Y for $5,000.
Recovery was denied on grounds that the release of X extended to Y.
Justice Zimmerman dissented, saying that the time interval separating the
two collisions prompted the conclusion that the issue of concurrent negli-
gence, as opposed to separate torts, should have been submitted to a
jury.81
The doctrine that a contract of settlement extends to all joint or
concurrent tortfeasors has been of especial benefit to the medical profes-
sion. Suppose A is injured by B and releases his claim. Thereafter A is
further impaired by the negligence of a physician treating the original
injury. The malpractice (unless it constitutes gross negligence) is
76. Lusted v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 71 Wis. 391 (1888).
77. 12 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 497 (Cir. Ct. 1908), afl'd mem., 81 Ohio St. 522, 91 N.E.
1127 (1909).
78. 170 Ohio St. 528, 166 N.E.2d 756 (1960).
79. Connelly v. United States Steel Co., 161 Ohio St. 448, 119 N.E.2d 843 (1954); Davis
v. Buckeye Light & Power Co., 145 Ohio St. 172, 61 NXE.2d 90 (1945); Royal Indem. Co.
v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N.E. 194 (1930). See Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Nickel, 120
Ohio St. 133, 165 NE. 719 (1929).
80. 150 Ohio St. 476, 83 N.E.2d 217 (1948).
81. Id. at 483-84, 83 NXE.2d at 222.
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deemed a continuation of the original tort, and the prior release absolves
the doctor of liability.82
In 1825 the Supreme Court of Ohio faced for the first time the
issue of a settlement executed by one of several tortfeasors. The contract
embodied a specific declaration of intent not to release the others. The
court determined the explicit provision to be of no bearing and held
that, notwithstanding the express intent of the parties, settlement with
one tortfeasor released the others.' This remained the law in Ohio for
ninety-four years until the case was overruled in 1919 by Adams Express
Company v. Beckwith,84 and today express qualifications in releases will
be given full effect.85 The only exception is that damages in subsequent
suits against the parties jointly liable must be confined to the excess in-
curred above the amount of settlement.86
It is to be noted that if a release is made with a party primarily liable,
it is a bar to an action against the party secondarily liable, despite express
provisions to the contrary."' This problem frequently arises where a
claimant is injured on a sidewalk and settles with the abutting property
owner. He cannot thereafter claim damages from the city."8
Covenants Not to Sue
A final consideration in regard to joint tortfeasors is whether the
settlement agreement is a release or a covenant not to sue. As to a single
liable party, a covenant not to sue is the same as a release. Both operate
to discharge liability. In City of Chicago v. Babcock the court stated:
But the rule is otherwise where there are two or more tort f.easors, and
the covenant is with one of them not to sue him. In such cases the
covenant does not operate as a release of either the covenantee or the
other tort feasors, but the former must resort to his suit for breach of
the covenant, and the latter can not invoke the covenant as a bar to the
action against them.89 (Emphasis added.)
82. Knight v. Strong, 101 Ohio App. 347, 140 N.E.2d 9 (1955); Seymour v. Carrol, 43
Ohio App. 60, 182 N.E. 647 (1932).
83. Ellis v. Bitzer, 2 Ohio 89 (1825). Accord, Ford Motor Co. v. Barry, 30 Ohio App.
528, 165 N.E. 865 (1928) (court applying Michigan law).
84. 100 Ohio St. 348, 126 N.E. 300 (1919).
85. Bacik v. Weaver, 173 Ohio St. 214, 180 N.E.2d 820 (1962); Ford Motor Co. v. Tom-
linson, 229 F.2d 873 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 826 (1956) (dictum); Prok v. Cleve-
land, 102 N.E.2d 253 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951); Sheridan v. Werkheiser, 88 Ohio App. 474,
100 N.E.2d 301 (1950).
86. Ford Motor Co. v. Tomlinson, 299 F.2d 873 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 826
(1956)) (dictum); Hillyer v. City of East Cleveland, 155 Ohio St. 552, 99 N.E.2d 772
(1957); Sheridan v. Werkheiser, 88 Ohio App. 474, 100 N.E.2d 301 (1950).
87. Hillyer v. City of East Cleveland, supra note 86; Herron v. City of Youngstown, 136
Ohio St. 190, 24 N.E.2d 708 (1940). But see City of Cleveland v. Hanson, 15 Ohio App.
409 (1921), affld =exn., 105 Ohio St. 646, 138 N.E. 925 (1922).
88. See note 87 supra.
89. 143 Ill. 358, 366-67 (1892).
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It has been stated that courts, recognizing the potential harshness of the
rule of releases as to joint tortfeasors, will interpret a settlement agree-
ment as a covenant not to sue where reasonably possible."
CONCLUSION
The problem embodied in releases is that they are ostensibly no dif-
ferent than ordinary business contracts. Judging them in this light
frequently results in the upholding of legal formalism at the expense
of justice. Some jurisdictions have chosen to view a release as a distinct
species of contract rendering the injured party in a more advantageous
position when a sense of fairness requires it. Ohio has characteristically
avoided this view. But the law in this area is still being made, and there
remains the possibility that the Ohio Supreme Court will redirect itself
towards the modern trend.
JONATiHAN S. DWORKIN
90. Dale Hilton, Inc. v. Triangle Pub., Inc., 198 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See 1
BELLi, MODERN TaIALs 352 and cases cited therein.
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